Abstract. This work deals with the communication complexity of secure multi-party protocols for linear algebra problems. In our model, complexity is measured in terms of the number of secure multiplications required and protocols terminate within a constant number of rounds of communication.
for secure polynomial evaluation that exploits properties of Chebychev polynomials, as well as a new secure protocol for computing the characteristic polynomial of a matrix based on Leverrier's lemma that exploits this new method.
Introduction
This paper deals with secure multi-party computation (MPC) , that is, with the scenario in which n players want to compute an agreed function of their secret inputs in such a way that the correct result is obtained but no additional information about the inputs is released. These requirements should be achieved even in the presence of an adversary who is able to corrupt some players. The power of a passive adversary is limited to see all internal data of the corrupted adversaries, while an active one can control their behavior.
Multi-party computation protocols can be classified according to which model of communication is considered. In the cryptographic model, first considered in [21, 11] , the adversary can see all messages in the network and the security must rely on some computational assumption. Unconditional security can be achieved if the existence of a private channel between every pair of participants is assumed. This is the information-theoretic model introduced in [5, 6] . It is well known that in both models any functionality can be securely evaluatedif evaluating the functionality is efficient, so is the secret multi-party protocol. However, generic solutions may need polynomial many rounds of communication between the participating players, whereas in practise one wants the round complexity to be as small as possible, preferably constant.
For conditionally secure multi-party protocols in the cryptographic model, every probabilistic polynomial-time functionality can be efficiently and privately evaluated in a constant number of communication rounds [22, 3] . The situation is completely different for unconditionally secure multi-party protocols in the information-theoretic model. Up to now it is not known yet which class of functions can be efficiently computed in a constant number of rounds. Some progress in the direction of solving that question was made in [1, 9, 12, 13, 2] but, for instance it is not even known if all functions in basic classes like NC can be securely evaluated in constant rounds.
For specific functions of interest from linear algebra, Cramer and Damgård [7] proposed constant round multi-party computation protocols in the informationtheoretic model. Among their considered functions are the determinant, the characteristic polynomial, the rank of a matrix, and solving a linear system of equations. The advantage with the approach from [7] is that all protocols could be tailor-made to the nature of the specific problem and, in contrast to the generic solutions, did not have to rely on circuit-based secure gate evaluation techniques.
Our Results
This work deals with the communication complexity of secure multi-party protocols for linear algebra problems. In our model, complexity is measured in terms of the number of secure multiplications required and protocols terminate within a constant number of rounds of communication.
Assuming a model in which constant round protocols for basic arithmetic operations are given as usual, previous work by Cramer and Damgård proposes secure protocols for solving systems Ax = b of m linear equations in n variables over a finite field, with m ≤ n. The complexity of those protocols is n 5 . Since a solution in [7] could only be obtained for square matrices the general case of non-square matrices had to be reduced to solving linear systems for the case of an n × n matrix which is potentially huge compared to the original m × n matrix A. The protocol for the latter problem basically reduces to computing n times the characterstic polynomial which is shown in [7] to be securely computable in constant rounds and with (roughly) n 4 complexity (n 4 calls to the multiplication protocol). Therefore the overall complexity of the proposed protocol to solve the linear system Ax = b is n 5 . We show a new upper bound of m 4 + n 2 m secure multiplications for this problem, which is clearly asymptotically smaller. Our main point, however, is that the advantage can be substantial in case m is much smaller than n. Indeed, if m = √ n, for example, the complexity goes down from n 5 to n 2.5 . As a concrete motivating application we consider the secure multi-party variant of the travelling salesman problem from combinatorial optimization. Given a number of t cities and the costs of travelling from any city to any other city, what is the cheapest round-trip route that visits each city exactly once and then returns to the starting city?
1 In a multi-party scenario the participating players may want to keep the travelling cost between two cities belonging to "their territory" secret such that only the concrete round-trip is revealed to everybody. It is well known [20, Vol 2, Chap. 58.4 ] that this problem can be reduced using integer linear programming to simultaneously solving two systems of linear equations, each of size m × n, where n = 2t · 2 m ≈ 2 m and m ≤ t 2 is the number of edges in the graph representing the cost-matrix between the t cities. Hence, in this (admittingly extreme) example complexity of our protocol is ≈ (2 m ) 2 , compared to the (2 m ) 5 protocol from [7] . Our secure protocols rely on some recent advances concerning the computation of the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of matrices over fields of positive characteristic. These computations are based on the evaluation of a certain characteristic polynomial, in combination with variations on a well-known technique due to Mulmuley that helps to control the effects of non-zero characteristic. We also introduce a new method for secure polynomial evaluation that exploits properties of Chebychev polynomials, as well as a new secure protocol for computing the characteristic polynomial of a matrix based on Leverrier's lemma that exploits this new method. These techniques may be of separate interest, and are central to our claimed improvements.
Below we give a more detailed overview of the techniques used. If A is an n × m matrix over a field K, a pseudoinverse of A is any m × n matrix B such that ABA = A and BAB = B. Note that in case A is a non-singular square matrix then B = A −1 . A linear system of equations Ax = b can be easily solved if a pseudoinverse of A is given. First of all, the system has a solution if and only if ABb = b. In this case, x 0 = Bb is a particular solution and, since the columns of the matrix I m − BA span ker A, the general solution of the system is obtained.
Our secure MPC protocol to solve linear systems of equations applies the results and techniques from [10] about using of the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse for solving linear systems of equations over arbitrary fields. Specifically, there is a polynomial that, evaluated on the Gram matrix G = A A, (where A denotes the transpose of A) makes it possible to efficiently compute in MPC the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of A. The polynomial in turn is derived from the characteristic polynomial of G = A A. Here our secure polynomial evaluation protocol based on Chebyshev polynomials can be used to perform the secure evaluation.
Nevertheless, the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of a matrix A exists if and only if the subspaces ker A and Im A have trivial intersection with their orthogonals, and unfortunately this may not be the case if the field has positive characteristic. This problem is solved by using some techniques from [10] , based on results by Mulmuley [17] . Namely, there exists a random invertible diagonal matrix that, with high probability, transforms the matrix A into a matrix A having the required properties on the subspaces ker A and Im A .
Computing the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse in particular involves secure evaluation of a public (or secret) polynomial in a secret field element (or a secret matrix). Motivated by this and maybe of independent interest, we present a constant round MPC protocol for the above task. If the field element (or the matrix) is guaranteed to be invertible this can be done using the well-known technique of unbounded fan-in multiplication [1] . In the general case of nonzero field elements a generic framework from [1] can be applied. However, the latter technique boosts the complexity of the resulting protocol from linear to quadratic in the degree d of the polynomial. One the other hand, if one admits some small probability of information leakage then the protocol can be made linear in d using certain randomization techniques.
We present an alternative protocol for the same task which is perfectly secure and has complexity linear in the degree d. The basic idea is explained in the following. Consider a matrix M (x) whose entries are polynomials over a finite field F and such that M (α) is invertible for every α ∈ F. Specifically, we present a 2 × 2 matrix M (x) such that in the top-left entry of M (2x)M i−1 (x) we have the ith Chebyshev polynomial T i (x). Since the first d + 1 Chebyshev polynomials {T i (x)} 0≤i≤d form a basis of the polynomials of degree at most d, every polynomial of degree d is a linear combination the Chebyshev polynomials. Therefore we can securely compute, even if α may be zero, F (α) for every polynomial F (x) with degree at most d by using the unbounded fan-in multiplication protocol to compute the needed powers of the matrix M (α).
Related Work
Nissim and Weinreb [19] also considered the problem of securely solving a set of linear equations in the computational two-party model, focusing on low (nearly optimal) communication complexity. Their protocol needs O(n 0.275 ) rounds of communication which was later improved to O(log n) [15] .
Preliminaries

The Model
We assume that n parties are connected by perfectly secure channels in a synchronous network. Let F p denote the finite field with p elements where p is a prime power. We will assume throughout that p is large enough because our protocols can only guarantee security with a probability 1 − O(n 2 /p), where n is the maximum number of rows or columns in the matrices appearing in the linear systems of equations.
By [a] we denote a secret sharing of a ∈ F p over F p . We assume that the secret-sharing scheme allows to compute a sharing for these operations. The secret-sharing scheme should of course also allow to take a sharing [c] and reveal the value c ∈ F p to all parties; We write c ← reveal([c]).
We also assume that the secret sharing scheme allows to compute a sharing [ab] from [a] and [b] with unconditional security. We denote the multiplication protocol by mult, and write
We will express the protocols' round complexities as the number of sequential rounds of mult invocations -and their communication complexities as the overall number of mult invocations. I.e., if we first run a copies of mult in parallel and then run b copies of mult in parallel, then we say that we have round complexity 2 and communication complexity a + b. Note that standard linear (verifiable) secret-sharing schemes have efficient constant-rounds protocols for multiplication.
For a matrix A ∈ F . Matrix multiplication has to be understood componentwise and can be carried out in one round and nmk parallel invocations of the multiplication protocol.
For our protocols to be actively secure, the secret sharing scheme and the multiplication protocol should be actively secure. This in particular means that the adversary structure must be Q2. By the adversary structure we mean the set A of subsets C ⊂ {1, . . . , n} which the adversary might corrupt; It is Q2 if it holds for all C ∈ A that {1, . . . , n} \ C ∈ A.
Some Known Techniques
The following known techniques will be of importance later on.
Random Elements. The parties can share a uniformly random, unknown field element. We write [a] ← ran(). This is done by letting each party P i deal a sharing [a i ] of a uniformly random a i ∈ F p . Then the parties compute the sharing
The communication complexity of this is given by n dealings, which we assume is upper bounded by the complexity of one invocation of the multiplication protocol.
If passive security is considered, this is trivially secure. If active security is considered and some party refuses to contribute with a dealing, the sum is just taken over the contributing parties. This means that the sum is at least taken over a i for i ∈ H, where H = {1, . . . , n} \ C for some C ∈ A. Since A is Q2 it follows that H ∈ A. So, at least one honest party will contribute to the sum, implying randomness and privacy of the sum. , then the algorithm aborts. This happens with probability less than 2/p. The complexity is (at most) 2 rounds and 3 invocations of mult.
Random
Unbounded Fan-In Multiplication. Using the technique from [1] it is possible to do unbounded fan-in multiplication in constant rounds. For the special case where we compute all "prefix products"
In the following, we only need the case where we have inputs [a 1 ], . . . , [a ] , where
We are often only interested in computing a 1, , but the method allows to compute any other a i0,i1 at the cost of one extra multiplication. For the complexity analysis, let A denote the number of a i0,i1 's which we want to compute.
First run ran * +1 times in parallel, to generate
, using 2 rounds and 3( + 1) invocations of mult. For simplicity we will use the estimate of 3 invocations. Then for i = 1, . . . , compute and reveal
, using 2 rounds and 2 invocations of mult. Now we have that 
for the special case where we compute all "prefix matrix products"
The above protocol generalizes to the matrix case, where a random invertible field element now translates to a random invertible matrix. Random invertible matrices are created using the same the method as generating a shared random invertible field element.
Equality. We define the equality function δ :
, there exists a protocol [8, 18] that computes, in a constant number of rounds and using O(log p) calls to the multiplication protocol mult, shares [δ(x)]. We write [y] ← eq([x]).
Secure Polynomial Evaluation
In this section we are interested in the natural problem of secure polynomial evaluation: the players hold a public (shared) polynomial F of maximal public degree d and a shared field element x. The goal is to securely evaluate F in x, i.e. to compute shares [F (x)].
Based on known techniques [1, 4] the latter shares can be computed in constant rounds and quadratic complexity, i.e. the protocol makes O(d 2 ) calls to the multiplication protocol.
Surprisingly, as we will show in this section, Chebyshev polynomials of the first and the second kind can be used as a mathematical tool to bring the complexity of the above problem down to linear. We will first consider the simpler case where the polynomial F (X) is publicly known and later reduce the case of a shared polynomial to the latter one.
Known Solution
First we present a naïve protocol based on known techniques with linear complexity. Unfortunately, as we will see, the protocol leaks information for the interesting case when the polynomial gets evaluated at zero.
The protocol is given a shared value [x] , where x ∈ F * p and a public polynomial can be computed without interaction as [
The complexity is constant rounds and 6d = O(d) invocations of the multiplication protocol mult. Privacy follows since we assumed x ∈ F * p and hence we can apply the protocol mult * securely. On the other hand, if x ∈ F * p then this fact will leak throughout the application of protocol mult * . As already done in [1] , using a technique from [4] , the general case (where the input may be equal to zero) can be reduced to unbounded fan-in multiplication of non-singular 3×3 matrices as we will sketch now. Later we will give an alternative protocol for the same task with improved running time. The main result from [4] states that every algebraic formula Φ of depth l can be expressed as the product of O(4 l ) non-singular 3× 3 matrices over F p (in the sense that the value Φ(x) can be read from the right top corner of the matrix product). Since any polynomial i , where the coefficients λ i can be computed by the players using only public information (including the value c). The protocol runs in a constant number of rounds and O(d) invocations of mult. However, it leaks information about x with probability 1/p. In the remainder of this section we will develop a perfectly secure protocol in O(d) invocations of mult.
Chebyshev Polynomials
We use Chebyshev polynomials of the first kind which satisfy the linear recurrence
with starting values T 0 (x) = 1 and T 1 (x) = x, and Chebyshev polynomials of the second kind
with starting values U 0 (x) = 1 and U 1 (x) = 2x. For notational convenience we also set 
The coefficients λ i only depend on the polynomial F , but not on x. (All λ i 's can be computed from the a i 's in O(d 2 log 2 p) bit operations using, for instance, the recursive formulas from [16] .) For x ∈ F p define the 2 × 2 matrix M (x) over F p as
and note that since det(M (x)) = 1, the matrix M (x) is always non-singular.
Claim. The following identity holds for any integer d ≥ 1:
We quickly prove the claim by induction over d. For d = 1 (2) is correct by definition. Now assume (2) holds for an integer d ≥ 1. Then we have
This shows (2) for d + 1.
Perfectly Secure Polynomial Evaluation of a Shared Field Element
We now come to our improvement over the protocols from Section 3.1. We design an alternative protocol to evaluate a polynomial in a share with running time linear in the degree d (instead of quadratic). The protocol does not leak any information about the shared secret x. Using the results on the Chebychev polynomials from the last section a protocol to securely evaluate a given public polynomial F ∈ 
Security is granted since M (x) and M (2x) are both non-singular. By Eq. (2) 
. , [F (x)]). The protocol runs in constant rounds and O(d) applications of the multiplication protocol.
It is easy to see that the given techniques can be extended to evaluate a shared value x in a shared polynomial F , i.e. the shared F is given by shares of its coefficients 
Theorem 1. Let a shared polynomial [F (X)] of maximal degree d (i.e., shared field elements
[a 0 ], . . . , [a d ] such that F (X) = d i=0 [a i ]X i )
and a shared field element [x] (for any x ∈ F p , possibly x = 0) be given. There exists a perfectly secure multi-party protocol that computes shares [F (x)] in constant rounds and O(d) applications of the multiplication protocol.
Perfectly Secure Polynomial Evaluation of a Shared Matrix
In this section we generalize the results from the last sections to the case of evaluating a shared matrix in a known/shared polynomial. , including the special case of singular A. Then again the following identity is easy to show by induction over d: 
Proposition 2. Let a set of public polynomials
F i ∈ F p [X] of
Solving Linear Systems of Equations
In this section we provide the necessary mathematical framework for understanding our algorithm. In particular, we present here the probabilistic algorithm to solve linear systems of equations that will be implemented in Section 5 in a secure multi-party computation protocol. This algorithm is based on the methods presented in [10] . Specifically, we solve the linear system of equations Ax = b by computing the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of the matrix A. Since we are dealing with finite fields, we have to use the results by Mulmuley [17] to avoid that certain subspaces have nontrivial intersection with their orthogonals.
Computing the Rank of a Matrix
Let K be a field. For every pair of vectors u, v ∈ K n , we notate u, v for the usual scalar product
If A is an n × m matrix over the field K , the Gram matrix of A is defined by G(A) = A A, where A denotes the transpose of A. For every i = 1, . . . , m, we take the vector u i ∈ K n corresponding to the i-th column of A. Then, the entries of the Gram matrix are the scalar products of these vectors, that is,
Consider the vector spaces E = K m and F = K n and let A be an n×m matrix over K representing a linear mapping A : E → F . Then, the transpose matrix A corresponds to a linear mapping A : F → E such that Ax, y = x, A y for every pair of vectors x ∈ E and y ∈ F . Then, ker A = (Im A) ⊥ and Im A = (ker A)
⊥ . The terminology we introduce in the following definition will simplify the presentation.
We say that a matrix A is suitable if Im A is a suitable subspace, that is, if (Im A)
⊥ ∩ Im A = {0}.
Lemma 1. Let A be an n × m matrix over K and let G = A A be its Gram matrix. Then A is a suitable matrix if and only if ker
⊥ , then x ∈ ker G = ker A, and hence y = 0. Proof. Since G is a symmetric matrix, Im G = (ker G) ⊥ . By applying Lemma 1,
Lemma 2. Let
Symmetrically, H is suitable as well.
Lemma 3. Let G be a symmetric m × m matrix and assume
and hence rank G = r.
From the previous lemmas the rank of the matrix A can be found by computing the characteristic polynomial of the Gram matrix G(A) = A A. Nevertheless, we need that both A and A are suitable matrices. If we are dealing with a field with positive characteristic we cannot be sure that this is the case. We avoid this problem by applying a random transformation to the matrix A that, with high probability, produces a matrix with the same rank and verifying that property. This can be done by using Theorem 3, due to Mulmuley [17] , and Propositions 3 and 4.
Theorem 3. Consider the field K(x), a transcendental extension of the field K, and the diagonal matrix
n is the natural extension of V , is suitable. As a consequence, for every n × m matrix A over the field K, the matrix
The proofs of the next two propositions will be given in the full version. 0 AA = A , we get that
The Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse can be used to solve a linear system of equations of the form Ax = b, but we need that both A and A are suitable matrices. Nevertheless, by using Proposition 4, we can apply a random transformation to the matrix A to obtain a matrix A α verifying this property with high probability.
The Algorithm
Given the theoretical results from the preceding sections, we extract the following probabilistic algorithm for solving linear systems of equations. 
Proof of Theorem 4 (sketch).
We show how to securely implement each step of the protocol linsolve from Section 4.3 within the given complexity bounds. We remark that, as a by-result, we also get efficient constant-round protocols for securely computing the characteristic polynomial and the rank of a given shared matrix. Details of the protocol are given in the full version of the paper. Instead we give some intuition and mention the main techniques used.
For the first two steps the players jointly agree on a common public value α. Since α is public, for computing shares of the appearing matrices there is no further interaction needed. Computing shares of the characteristic polynomial in
Step 4 is done with the protocol from Theorem 5. In Step 5, shares of the rank need to be computed that, by Lemma 3, can be derived from the characteristic polynomial. Here we have to use several sequential applications of the equality protocol eq to finally compute the rank in unary representation.
Step 6 computes shares of the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse. Note that the formula to compute A † α explicitly depends on the rank r of matrix G. Since we do not know r in the clear we need to develop a technique to obliviously evaluate the matrix G in the correct polynomial. A first approach is to evaluate A † α for all the possible values of the rank r ∈ {1, . . . , m} and then sum the resulting matrices weighted with the respective bit indicating if the summation index equals the rank. Note that shares of the latter bits are known from the last step. However, the naive complexity of this approach is m 5 . Using certain linearities in the coefficients of the sums of the above polynomials we develop an alternative approach to obtain the necessary complexity O(m 4 ). Efficiency of this step heavily relies on our efficient polynomial evaluation protocols proposed in Section 3. The rest of the steps are more or less easy to implement. We mention that the complexity of the protocol is dominated by Steps 4 and 6 (O(m 4 )),
Step 5 (O(m · log p) for in total O(m) applications of eq), and computing two products of an m × n with an m × m matrix (O(m 2 n)) in Steps 3 and 6. Security of the protocol follows by the security of the sub-protocols used.
Proof of Theorem 5 (sketch).
We assume we are given shares of a symmetric square m × m matrix, if not apply the first three steps of the Linsolve protocol using O(m 2 n) multiplications. Due to [7] there already exists a constant-round protocol for computing shares of the characteristic polynomial. We present an alternative and much simpler protocol based on Leverrier's Lemma (see Lemma 5) which basically says that the coefficients of the characteristic polynomial can be retrieved by inverting a certain non-singular lower-triangular matrix S, where each entry below the diagonal is the trace of the powers G i of the matrix G. Leverrier's lemma is obtained by combining Newton's identities with the fact that these traces correspond to sums of powers of the characteristic roots.
Computing shares of all the m powers G i of G can be done using the protocol from Proposition 2 in O(m 4 ) applications of the multiplication protocol. All the traces of G i can be locally computed by the players and assembled into the m×m matrix S. Finally the players compute the inverse of the non-singular matrix S using the protocol inv which enables them to compute the coefficients of the characteristic polynomial. The total complexity of the protocol is O(m 4 + m 2 n) applications of the multiplication protocol and it runs in constant rounds. More details will be given in Appendix A. Security of the protocol follows by the security of the sub-protocols used.
A Protocol for the Characteristic Polynomial
We assume we are given shares of a symmetric square m × m matrix (possibly singular), if not apply the first three steps of the Linsolve protocol using O(m 2 n) multiplications. We want to compute shares ([a 1 ], . . . , [a m ] ) of the characteristic polynomial of G. With the techniques of Cramer and Damgård [7] this can be reduced to computing m times (in parallel) the determinant of a non-singular matrix and applying polynomial interpolation to reconstruct the coefficients.
